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WHORTON v. BOCKTING AND THE
WATERSHED EXCEPTION OF
TEAGUE v. LANE
TADHG DOOLEY*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Whorton v. Bockting,1 the Supreme Court considered whether
its rule from Crawford v. Washington,2 prohibiting the admission of
testimonial hearsay statements without a prior opportunity for the
defendant to cross-examine the declarant, should be applied
retroactively to cases on collateral appeal under the standard set forth
3
in Teague v. Lane. The determination rested on whether Crawford
announced a “new rule” that should be applied retroactively by virtue
of its being a “watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”4 In a
unanimous decision, the Court held that Crawford did announce a
“new rule” of criminal procedure, but that “this rule does not fall
within the Teague exception for watershed rules.”5 Therefore, the
respondent could not benefit from the Crawford rule during the
collateral review of his original state court conviction.
The outcome of the case was not surprising given the high bar the
Court has set for finding a watershed rule in decisions after Teague.
Since the Teague standard was announced, the Court has not found a
single rule that satisfies its requirements.6 However, prior to the
* 2008 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 35 (2004).
3. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
4. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1181(quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
5. Id. at 1184.
6. See, e.g., Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (rejecting retroactivity for Ring v.
Arizona, 546 U.S. 584 (2002)); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (rejecting retroactivity for
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) (rejecting
retroactivity for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S.
333 (1993) (rejecting retroactivity for a new rule relating to jury instructions on homicide);

2008__01 -- DOOLEY__FMT.DOC

2

12/30/2008 4:33:25 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

VOL. 3:1

decision, some commentators thought that this case might be that
“rare blockbuster” that was able to satisfy the strict requirements of
7
Teague and qualify for retro-application to cases on collateral review.
Indeed, Bockting’s attorney, Nevada Public Defender Franny
Forsman, remarked, “The reason that no new rule has been held to
apply retroactively since Teague is because the court has not seen this
8
case.” The Court’s unanimous and authoritative decision therefore
has implications beyond this particular case. If the Crawford rule was
not a watershed rule, what is?
II. BACKGROUND
The facts of the case illustrate the dilemma judges face when
trying to balance the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants
to confront the witnesses against them with society’s interest in
protecting abused children from the potential trauma of facing their
alleged abusers in court.
Marvin Bockting lived in Las Vegas with his wife, Laura, their
three-year-old daughter, Honesty, and Laura’s six-year-old daughter,
Autumn, from a previous relationship.9 Within the close quarters of
the family’s rented motel room, the six-year-old Autumn obtained
sexual knowledge beyond her years, having taken showers with Laura
and Marvin and witnessed them having sex on several occasions.10
On January 16, 1988, while Bockting was away from the residence,
Autumn woke up crying. According to Laura’s testimony during the
trial, Autumn told her that Bockting had repeatedly put his “pee-pee
in her pee-pee,” that he had put his “pee-pee in her butt,” that he
made her “suck his pee-pee like a sucker” until “white bubbly stuff”
11
came out into her mouth, and that “he put his chin on her pee-pee.”

Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (rejecting retroactivity for Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320 (1985)).
7. See, e.g., Professor Robert Mosteller, Remarks at Duke Law School Program in Public
Law Panel on Upcoming Supreme Court Term (Aug. 28, 2004). Summary available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/features/2006/supremecourtterm.html (last visited March 4, 2007).
8. Posting
of
Franny
Forsman
to
The
Confrontation
Blog,
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2006/05/supreme-court-to-decide-retroactivity.html (May
15, 2006, 20:22 EST).
9. Brief of Petitioner, Whorton v. Bockting, No. 05-595, 2006 WL 2066492, at 3. (Jul. 19,
2006) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
10. Id.
11. Id. These quotes are taken from Laura’s testimony at trial.
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When Bockting came home the next morning, Laura confronted him,
but not before first asking him for the rent money and leaving him
12
alone with the girls while she left to pay the rent. Bockting denied
having touched Autumn and when Laura said she was taking the child
13
to the doctor to be checked, Bockting encouraged her to do so.
Bockting voluntarily left the residence. As he was leaving, Autumn
14
seemed distraught and wanted to hug and kiss him.
Two days later, Laura took Autumn to the hospital and a
gynecologist examined the child. The examining doctor later testified
that she found a recent tear in the rectal sphincter and a wide opening
in the hymenal ring, injuries that were consistent with “blunt force”
15
trauma. She also testified that these injuries would have caused pain,
particularly during urination. However, there was no testimony that
Autumn was in any pain leading up to the examination.16
At the hospital, a police detective attempted to interview Autumn,
but Autumn was too distraught to explain what happened and said
17
only that someone had hurt her. However, two days later the
detective again met with Autumn and this time was able to speak to
her at length, in the company of her mother. Autumn described what
happened to her in the same way she had earlier conveyed it to Laura.
She also demonstrated the incidents in great detail using anatomically
correct dolls.18 Following this interview, Bockting was arrested and
charged with four counts of sexual assault on a minor under the age
of fourteen.19
At Bockting’s preliminary hearing, Autumn appeared to testify.
However, when the prosecutor began questioning her about the
incidents of abuse, she became very upset and her statements lost
consistency. Still, the trial court was persuaded that there was
sufficient evidence to hold Bockting for trial.20 Prior to the start of
trial, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether

12. Brief of Respondent, Whorton v. Bockting, No. 05-595, 2006 WL 2736637, at 3. (Sep.
20, 2006). [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
13. Id.
14. Petitioner’s Brief at 3.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Respondent’s Brief at 4.
17. Petitioner’s Brief at 4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (2007).
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Autumn could testify. Because she was again too distressed to take
the stand, the court declared her unavailable and granted the State’s
motion, over Bockting’s objection, to allow Laura and the detective to
21
recount her pretrial statements. The court invoked a Nevada statute
that allowed out-of-court statements made by a child under ten
describing a sexual assault to be admitted if the court finds that the
child is unavailable to testify and that “circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”22
The trial court’s ruling was consistent with the Supreme Court’s
23
holding in Ohio v. Roberts. There, the Court held that the
24
Confrontation Clause permits the admission of prior hearsay
statements, as long as the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial
25
and the statement “bears adequate indicia of reliability.” The Court
noted that the hearsay statement may be found reliable if it fits within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or if there are “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness”26 working in its favor. In Bockting’s
case, there was no firmly rooted hearsay exception involved, but the
trial court allowed the hearsay statements because they were attended
by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. As the Nevada
Supreme Court later found, several factors, including the “natural
spontaneity” of Autumn’s first description of the assaults, the level of
detail in which she described them, the consistency of her story when
related to the detective four days later, and her use of anatomically
correct dolls, all counseled for the admission of her hearsay
statements.27
At the end of the three-day trial, the jury found Bockting guilty on
three counts of sexual assault on a minor and sentenced him to serve
two consecutive life sentences and a concurrent life sentence, all with
28
the possibility of parole. After exhausting his state remedies,
Bockting sought habeas corpus relief in federal court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his Confrontation Clause rights were

21. Petitioner’s Brief at 4.
22. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.2851(a) (2003).
23. Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56 (1980).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
25. Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted).
26. Id.
27. Bockting v. State, 109 Nev. 103, 109–12 (1993) (per curiam).
28. Petitioner’s Brief at 5.
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29
violated by the admission of the hearsay statements. The District
Court denied Bockting’s petition, and Bockting appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.30
After oral arguments in the case, but before the Ninth Circuit
made its decision, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Crawford v. Washington.31 Crawford abrogated the Roberts
test, holding that testimonial statements from witnesses who do not
appear at trial can be admitted “only where the declarant is
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
32
opportunity to cross-examine.” Justice Scalia, writing for a seven
justice majority, wrote that Roberts had strayed from the original
understanding of the Confrontation Clause and was too “malleable”
33
in permitting ex parte testimonial statements. Rather than apply this
“malleable” standard, the Court held that “[w]here testimonial
evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”34
Clearly, under Crawford, Autumn Bockting’s hearsay statements
would have been inadmissible because they were testimonial and
Bockting had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her. But it was
unclear whether the Crawford rule could be applied to Bockting’s
case, which had been properly decided under the Court’s previous
holding in Roberts. Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel requested
supplemental briefing on the question of whether Crawford should be
35
applied retroactively to Bockting’s appeal. The answer depended on
whether Crawford constituted a “watershed rule of criminal
procedure” under Teague v. Lane.36
In Teague, the Supreme Court held that “[u]nless they fall within
an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced.”37 The Teague Court

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 35 (2004).
Id. at 59.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 67.
Id.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 310.
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recognized two exceptions to this general rule. First, it would only
apply to new rules of procedural due process, and not to new rules of
substantive due process, which affect “‘certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law38
making authority to proscribe.’” Second, “a new rule should be
applied retroactively if it requires the observance of ‘those procedures
39
that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Only
“watershed rules of criminal procedure”40—those that are “central to
an accurate determination of guilt”41—would qualify for the exception
to the general rule. As for what qualifies as a “new” rule, the Court
held that, “[i]n general . . . a case announces a new rule when it breaks
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
42
Government.”
In subsequent cases, the Court further explicated the second
Teague exception, demarking two requirements for a rule to qualify as
watershed: first, it must be necessary to prevent “an impermissibly
43
large risk” of an inaccurate conviction; second, it must “alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
44
fairness of a proceeding.” The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the watershed exception is “extremely narrow”45 and that it is
“‘unlikely’” that any watershed rules “‘ha[ve] yet to emerge.’”46
Indeed, the Court has never found a rule to meet the watershed
requirements.
47
The Court has identified Gideon v. Wainwright as perhaps the
only case that qualifies as formulating a watershed rule of criminal
48
procedure. In Gideon, the Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth

38. Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
39. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
40. Id. at 311.
41. Id. at 313.
42. Id. at 301.
43. Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004).
44. Id.
45. E.g., id. at 352.
46. Id. (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 353 U.S. 656 (2001)).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (“This Court has yet to find a new
rule that falls under this exception. In providing guidance as to what might do so, the Court has
repeatedly, and only, referred to the right-to-counsel rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, which
altered the Court's understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of
a proceeding.” (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 364 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Amendments to the Constitution require that any indigent defendant
49
charged with a felony be provided with counsel. In the post-Teague
cases, the Court observed that Gideon qualified as a watershed rule
because it “‘alter[ed] [the Court’s] understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’”50 The
message to prisoners seeking to have new rules applied to their
collateral appeals is that the source of the new rule must be
comparable to Gideon, and distinguishable from the line of cases in
which the court has refused to apply new rules retroactively.
On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit agreed with
Bockting’s argument that Crawford qualified as a Teague exception
and should be applied retroactively to his case.51 A majority of two
judges concluded that Crawford announced a new rule of criminal
procedure, and a different majority of two judges concluded that the
rule should have been applied in Bockting’s case because it fit within
the Teague exception for watershed rules. Because the panel’s
decision conflicted with those of every other Circuit Court and State
Supreme Court to consider the issue of Crawford’s retroactivity, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.52
III. DECISION AND RATIONALE
In a unanimous opinion the Court held that though Crawford
announced a new rule of criminal procedure, it does not fall within
the Teague v. Lane exception for watershed rules.53 The opinion was a
somewhat routine application of Teague and its progeny, but it did
clarify a few essential questions that had divided the Ninth Circuit
panel.
Justice Alito wrote the opinion of the Court and summarized the
rule for retroactive application of new rules:
Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct
and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to
cases that are still on direct review. A new rule applies
retroactively only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a

49. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45.
50. Beard, 542 U.S. at 407 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)) (brackets
and emphasis in original).
51. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
52. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
53. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1180.
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‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the
54
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.

Following this framework, the opinion addressed first whether
Crawford formulated a new rule or merely applied an old rule;
second, whether the new rule announced was procedural or
substantive; and third, whether it qualifies as retroactive under either
of the two Teague exceptions.
With regard to the first question, Justice Alito defined a new rule
as “a rule that . . . was not ‘dictated by precedent existing at the time
55
the defendant’s conviction became final.’” Under this standard,
Crawford clearly announced a new rule because it was not dictated by
56
existing precedent. Justice Alito went further in suggesting that
Crawford actually overruled Roberts, and thus must be considered a
new rule.57 According to the Court, Judge Noonan of the Ninth
Circuit—who had argued that Crawford merely applied an old rule—
erred in focusing on the holdings of prior Confrontation Clause
decisions, rather than their rationales. Though the Crawford Court
observed that prior holdings, including that from Roberts, had been
consistent with the proper confrontation rule that Crawford was
announcing, it also noted that the rationales of those cases had been
inconsistent with the rule it was announcing.58 Because Crawford’s
rationale broke with prior precedent, the Bockting court reasoned it
was a new rule, and state courts applying the prior rule in good faith
should not have their convictions disturbed unless the new rule was
either substantive or a watershed rule of criminal procedure.59
As for the first exception, the Court quickly held that “it is clear
and undisputed that the [Crawford] rule is procedural and not
60
substantive.” The Court then devoted the bulk of its analysis to the
question of whether the Crawford rule might qualify under the
second Teague exception as a watershed rule of criminal procedure.

54. Id. at 1180–1181 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
55. Id. at 1181 (quoting Saffle 494 U.S. at 488; Teague, 489 U.S. at 301) (emphasis in
original).
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488 (“The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no
doubt creates a new rule.”)).
58. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 35, 57–60 (2004)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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The Court first emphasized the qualifying language of its holdings,
61
that the watershed exception “is ‘extremely narrow,’” and that “it is
‘“unlikely’ that any such rules ‘ha[ve] yet to emerge.’”62 The Court
then provided another iteration of the watershed rule:
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two
requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. Second, the
rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
63
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.

The Court held that Crawford does not satisfy the first
requirement because it does not prevent an impermissibly large risk
64
of inaccurate conviction. The Court clarified that, in order for a new
rule to satisfy this first requirement, “it is not enough to say that the
rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial or that the rule is
directed toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some
sense.”65 Rather, the rule must remedy an impermissibly large risk of
66
an inaccurate conviction.
In this regard, the Court again identified Gideon v. Wainwright as
the guidepost, noting that “[w]hen a defendant who wishes to be
represented by counsel is denied representation . . . the risk of an
67
unreliable verdict is intolerably high.” In contrast, the Crawford rule
is far narrower in scope and its effect on the accuracy of a conviction
68
is “far less direct and profound.” The Court noted that the reason
Crawford overruled Roberts was not because it wished to improve the
accuracy of fact finding in criminal trials, but rather because it wished
to return to the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause.69
Furthermore, as the majority wrote, it is far from clear that Crawford
is a greater guarantor of accuracy than the pre-existing rule under
Roberts. Though Crawford may have improved accuracy in criminal
trials involving testimonial hearsay statements, it completely
eliminated any Confrontation Clause protection of non-testimonial
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. (quoting Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).
Id. (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352, and Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001)).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1182.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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70
hearsay statements. Roberts had at least required that such
statements be deemed reliable before being admitted. Because
Crawford removed such statements from the scope of the
Confrontation Clause and thus permits their admission without prior
cross-examination even when there are no indicia of reliability, it does
not seem to promote accuracy in these cases.71
Thus, the effect of Crawford on the accuracy of the criminal factfinding process is a mixed bag: with respect to testimonial hearsay it
may promote accuracy, but with respect to non-testimonial hearsay, it
is actually less of a guarantor of accuracy than the earlier Roberts
regime. In any event, the Court cautioned that its duty under Teague
was not to weigh both sides and decide whether there is “some net
improvement in the accuracy of fact finding in criminal cases.”72
Rather, it was to determine whether the sort of testimony that would
be admissible under Roberts “is so much more unreliable than that
admissible under Crawford that the Crawford rule is ‘one without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished.’”73 The Court had no trouble finding that it was not.
Although the Court had earlier stated that both requirements of
the watershed exception must be met, and it had already decided that
the first requirement was not, it went on to briefly discuss the second
requirement as well. The Court of Appeals had erred in relying on the
conclusion that the right of confrontation itself is a bedrock
procedural rule. The proper inquiry is whether the new rule itself
“constitute[s] a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element
that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”74 The Court again
looked to Gideon for guidance in answering this question, and found
that the Crawford rule, “while certainly important, is not in the same
category with Gideon.”75 Whereas Gideon effected “a profound and
sweeping change,”76 Crawford lacks that “primacy” and “centrality.”77
Because the Court had already decided the case based on the first

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1183.
73. Id. (quoting Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005) (Wallace, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
74. Id. (citing Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d at 1019).
75. Id. at 1184.
76. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
77. Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
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exception, it did not elaborate on its determination that Crawford
does not equal Gideon in primacy. It simply held that Crawford “does
not qualify as a rule that ‘alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock
78
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’”
In sum, despite a proliferation of briefs on both sides, and a fair
amount of commentary suggesting that this might finally be the case
to find a rule retroactive, the Court issued a remarkably
unremarkable decision. The opinion was a straightforward application
of Teague and its progeny, holding simply that “Crawford announced
a ‘new rule’ of criminal procedure and that this rule does not fall
79
within the Teague exception for watershed rules.”
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: THE WATERSHED EXCEPTION
AFTER BOCKTING
Due in part to its simplicity, Whorton v. Bockting goes a long way
in clarifying the standards for retroactive application of new rules of
criminal procedure. From the Court’s decision, one can deduce a
number of relevant rules for retroactivity analysis.
First, on the question of whether a rule is new or not, the relevant
inquiry is whether it was dictated by prior precedent. This part of the
Court’s opinion did not break any new ground, but it did clarify that,
when considering whether a rule is a break from precedent, courts
must look to the rationale behind the previous decisions, not at the
results of those decisions.
More importantly, with regard to the question of whether a new
rule is watershed, the Court clarified that the rule must both be
necessary to prevent an unacceptable risk of an inaccurate conviction
and alter our understanding of bedrock procedural elements
necessary to a fair trial. For each avenue of inquiry, the yardstick is
Gideon. A new rule must be equally necessary to prevent inaccurate
convictions as is Gideon and it must be just as groundbreaking in its
effect on our understanding of bedrock procedures. This is a long yard
indeed.
The Court devoted the most attention to the first requirement,
that the rule be necessary to prevent inaccurate convictions.

78. Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
79. Id.
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Importantly, the Court stressed that the question is not whether there
is some measurable gain in accuracy derived from the new rule, but
rather whether the old rule, if continually applied, would result in an
impermissibly large risk of inaccurate fact-finding. Henceforth, any
defendant attempting to have a new rule retroactively applied will
have to show that the rule under which he was convicted seriously
diminishes the accuracy of not only his trial, but the criminal
proceeding in the universal sense. This is an exceedingly high
standard, as it is difficult to imagine a procedural rule that has so
great a tendency to produce inaccurate results and yet has been
applied by the courts for however many decades prior to the new
rule’s announcement.
Even if a case that passed the accuracy prong were to surface, it
would still have to meet the bedrock requirement before constituting
a watershed rule. Bockting requires that the defendant prove that the
new rule itself constitutes a “previously unrecognized bedrock
procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”80
It is difficult to conceive of how a rule can be both new (that is, a rule
that had not been recognized for over two hundred years) and yet
also “bedrock” at the same time. Here the Court offered little
guidance, because it had already decided the case based on the
accuracy prong of the watershed test. It suggested again that Gideon
is the guidepost, and that the new rule must as be “sweeping” and
“profound,” as that landmark case, but did not explain why Crawford
was not. Suffice it to say, though, that if Crawford—which had a
profound effect on the manner in which criminal trials are managed—
does not amount to a landmark decision, few if any cases will. It is this
skepticism that seems to be the subtext of the entire decision: no new
rule of criminal procedure will ever be “watershed enough” to satisfy
the Court’s retroactivity rules.

80. Id. at 1183.

